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From Bali to Copenhagen: Towards a Shared
Vision for a Post-2012 Climate Regime?
JUTTA BRUNNÉE†
_______________________

I. INTRODUCTION
In December 2009, the eyes of the world were on the Danish
capital Copenhagen. ―Copenhagen‖ was to set the world on course to
forestall dangerous climate change. To that end, Copenhagen was to
yield at least the contours of a global regime that would commit all
major economies to a long-term curbing of their greenhouse gas
emissions. But Copenhagen did not go as planned. In the end, it
produced a slim document dubbed the Copenhagen Accord,
negotiated at the eleventh hour by only five countries (Brazil, China,
India, South Africa, and the United States) and later ―taken note of‖
by the 194 parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) just before their meeting was gavelled to
a close.1 U.S. President Barack Obama, who had brokered the
Copenhagen Accord, called it a ―meaningful and unprecedented
† Metcalf Chair in Environmental Law, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto.
This Article draws on JUTTA BRUNNÉE & STEPHEN J. TOOPE, Climate Change:
Building a Global Legal Regime, in LEGITIMACY AND LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: AN INTERACTIONAL ACCOUNT (forthcoming Aug. 2010) (manuscript at ch. 4,
on file with author).
1. See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change, Fifteenth Sess., Dec. 7–18, 2009, Copenhagen, Den., Draft
Decision -/CP 15: Proposal by the President, Copenhagen Accord, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2009/L.7 (Dec. 18, 2009) [hereinafter Copenhagen Accord], available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/l07.pdf; PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL
CLIMATE CHANGE, SUMMARY OF COP 15 AND CMP 5 (2009),
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/copenhagen-cop15-summary.pdf.
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breakthrough . . . .‖2 But for many others the outcome spells failure,
both in the world‘s fight against climate change and in the UN
climate change regime.3
Climate change may well be the single most important public
policy challenge of our time.4 It is planetary in scope and intergenerational in its implications. Even more importantly, because
climate change implicates virtually all production and consumption
processes, addressing it is about nothing less than changing the way
we do everything that we do everywhere in the world. Climate
change, then, is also a classic collective action problem. It can be
solved only if all states, or at least the major greenhouse gas emitters,
cooperate.
In addition, climate change raises a series of difficult questions of
equity and, some say, global environmental justice.5 Historically,
emissions of greenhouse gases have been far greater in the
industrialized world. The emissions of industrialized countries still
significantly exceed those of developing countries,6 although the
emissions of some large developing countries are projected to rise
sharply over the next two decades.7 In 2006, China surpassed the
United States as the largest national emitter of greenhouse gases.8
2. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President During Press Availability
in
Copenhagen
(Dec.
18,
2009)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-during-pressavailability-copenhagen).
3. See, e.g., James Kanter, E.U. Blames Others for „Great Failure‟ on Climate,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/23/w
orld/europe/23iht-climate.html; Donna Bryson, South Africa Blasts Copenhagen
Failure, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 22, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wir
eStory?id=9399596.
4. See, e.g., David A. King, Climate Change Science: Adapt, Mitigate or
Ignore?, 303 SCI. 176, 176 (2004).
5. For an extensive, interdisciplinary literature review, see Stephen M. Gardiner,
Ethics and Global Climate Change, 114 ETHICS 555 (2004).
6. This is true for total, per capita, and especially historic global emissions. See,
e.g., KEVIN BAUMERT & JONATHAN PERSHING, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE, CLIMATE DATA: INSIGHTS AND OBSERVATIONS 4, 11, 13 (2004),
http://www.pewclimate.org/global-warming-in-depth/all_reports/.
7. Id. at 15–16.
8. See UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, EACH COUNTRY‘S SHARE OF CO2
EMISSIONS (2006),
http://www.ucsusa.org/globalwarming/scienceandimpacts/science/each-countrysshare-of-co2.html; John Vidal & David Adam, China Overtakes US as World‟s
Biggest CO2 Emitter, GUARDIAN, June 19, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/env
ironment/2007/jun/19/china.usnews.
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However, Chinese per capita emissions remain far lower than those
of the United States or the European Union.9
The effects of climate change are likely to disproportionately
impact developing countries, many of which are especially
vulnerable to such effects.10 Industrialized countries have vastly
larger economic and technological capacity not only to mitigate
greenhouse gas emissions but also to adapt to its consequences.11
The gulf between radically different perceptions of the problem is
not easily bridged. Many developing countries see climate politics as
part of a larger pattern of historical and economic injustices and so
demand that industrialized countries bear the primary burden of
combating climate change. In turn, many industrialized countries
insist on developing country participation as a matter of pragmatic
problem solving or even ―fairness.‖12
The UNFCCC was adopted in 199213 and supplemented by the
Kyoto Protocol in 1997.14 However, the Kyoto Protocol imposes
emission reduction commitments on only some of the major emitters
and does so only for the period from 2008 to 2012. Negotiations for a
more comprehensive set of mid- and long-term commitments were
meant to lead to an agreement by the end of 2009, but the outcome of
the December meeting leaves uncertain whether and when the
Copenhagen Accord will be turned into a formal legal instrument.
Much attention has been paid to the back-and-forth between China
(and India) and the United States. I want to suggest that the climate
9. Steve Howard & Changhua Wu, Foreword to THE CLIMATE GROUP, CHINA‘S
CLEAN REVOLUTION (2008),
http://www.theclimategroup.org/_assets/files/Chinas_Clean_Revolution.pdf (noting
that, ―[i]n 2007, China reached a per capita level of 5.1 metric tons compared to the
European Union‘s 8.6 metric tons and the USA‘s 19.4 metric tons‖) (citation
omitted).
10. BAUMERT & PERSHING, supra note 6, at 17–18.
11. See id. at 17–20.
12. See J. TIMMONS ROBERTS & BRADLEY C. PARKS, A CLIMATE OF INJUSTICE:
GLOBAL INEQUALITY, NORTH-SOUTH POLITICS, AND CLIMATE POLICY 136 (2007).
13. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S.
TREATY DOC. NO. 102–38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC].
14. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto
Protocol].
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negotiations are not just about who cuts or pays how much and who
drives the hardest bargain. They are also about ―principle.‖ In other
words, agreement on the principles that frame the climate regime is
key to its evolution. My argument is that it is crucial to arrive at both
a genuinely shared understanding of the regime‘s framing principle,
common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR), and a post-2012
agreement that is consonant with that understanding. It is equally
crucial to agree on the stated objective of the climate regime, namely
to avert dangerous climate change.
Both the regime‘s objective and CBDR are enshrined in the
Climate Convention, but the treaty text left the underlying scientific
and normative controversies unresolved. The efforts to develop a
―shared vision for long-term cooperative action,‖15 launched at a
meeting of the parties in Bali in 2007, ran into various stumbling
blocks in Copenhagen. Nevertheless, these continued efforts provide
an opportunity to explore how the objective and CBDR have shaped
parties‘ positions and, in turn, how regime participants have sought to
clarify and shift the meaning of these norms.
In this brief Article, I first offer an overview of the CBDR
principle as it has evolved in the regime and develop my argument
that CBDR, in turn, has been the climate regime‘s anchor principle,
shaping its evolution and accounting at least in part for its resilience.
I then evaluate the outcome of the Copenhagen negotiations in light
of the regime objective and the CBDR principle.
II. CBDR AND THE CLIMATE REGIME
Before turning to an assessment of the role of CBDR, it is
important to consider another element of the treaty, which might at
first glance seem to play merely a perfunctory role—namely the
provision outlining its objective. As will become apparent, the
objective and CBDR together provide the parameters for action under
the climate regime. Global measures to combat climate change must
not only be capable of meeting the regime‘s objective; they must also
do so in accordance with the CBDR principle. Similarly, it would not
be enough for climate action under the regime to be in keeping with
15. Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, Thirteenth Sess., Bali, Indon., Dec. 3–15, 2007, Decision
1/CP.13, Bali Action Plan, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (Mar. 14, 2008)
[hereinafter Bali Action Plan], available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/
cop13/eng/06a01.pdf#page=3.
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parties‘ common but differentiated responsibilities, as the parties‘
actions must also measure up to the treaty objective. In the following
discussion, I focus less on the formal legal requirements that may
flow from the objective and the CBDR principle than on the
influence that they in fact exert on the evolution of the climate
regime.
A. The Role of the Objective
The ―ultimate objective of [the Climate] Convention and any
related legal instruments . . . is to achieve . . . [the] stabilization of
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate
system.‖16
Among the parties to the Climate Convention, this objective has
achieved a taken-for-granted quality. It underpins the Kyoto Protocol
and has framed the negotiations for post-2012 commitments.17 But
only relatively recently has a stronger shared understanding emerged
around the meaning of the regime‘s objective.18 The release in 2007
of the Fourth Assessment Report by the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) injected a new sense of urgency into the
discussions19 and provided unequivocal evidence of human induced
16. UNFCCC, supra note 13, art. 2.
17. States, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental observers
routinely invoke the objective in submission to the Ad Hoc Working Group on
Long-Term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA). For access to submissions made
since the AWG-LCA‘s first session in March 2008, see United Nations, Documents
of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the
Convention, http://unfccc.int/meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/lca/items/4918.php
(last visited Mar. 4, 2010). E.g., United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the
Convention, Fourth Sess., Poznan, Pol., Dec. 1–10, 2008, Ideas and Proposals on
Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan, U.N. Doc. FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/16/Rev.1
(Jan. 15, 2009), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2008/awglca4/eng/16
r01.pdf.
18. See Malte Meinshausen et al., Greenhouse-Gas Emission Targets for
Limiting Global Warming to 2° C, 458 NATURE 1158, 1158 (2009) (noting that
―[m]ore than 100 countries have adopted a global warming limit of 2˚ C or below
(relative to pre-industrial levels) as a guiding principle for mitigation efforts to
reduce climate change risks, impacts and damages‖) (citation omitted).
19. See Richard B. Alley et al., IPCC 2007: Summary for Policymakers, in
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS. CONTRIBUTION OF
WORKING GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE
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climate change.20 Perhaps most importantly, the IPCC drove home
the point that global greenhouse gas emissions would have to peak
around 2020 and would have to be dramatically reduced by 2050 if
there was to be a reasonable chance of averting dangerous warming.21
However, it was not until 2009 that the major emitting states were
finally willing to quantify that objective, agreeing that global
temperature increases should not exceed two degrees Celsius above
pre-industrial levels. This agreement was reflected first in
declarations of the 2009 G8 Summit and the Major Economies Forum
(MEF) on Energy and Climate convened by U.S. President Obama to
engage the seventeen states that account for roughly eighty percent of
global carbon emissions.22 The two-degree Celsius benchmark was
also confirmed in the Copenhagen Accord.23 African and small island
states had been pushing especially hard for recognition of a more
ambitious temperature limit of 1.5 degrees Celsius,24 but in this
respect the Copenhagen Accord calls only for an assessment of its
implementation by 2015 in light of, among other things, the
Convention‘s ultimate objective.25

INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 1 (Susan Solomon et al. eds.,
2007). A growing chorus of voices warns that even the IPCC‘s worst-case
scenarios are in fact too conservative and that global climate change is occurring at
a much faster rate than expected, in part due to various feedback effects. See PEW
CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, KEY SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE
IPCC FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT: SCIENCE BRIEF 2 (2009), http://www.pewcli
mate.org/brief/science-developments/June2009.
20. See Alley et al., supra note 19, at 2–3 (considering it to be ―very likely,‖ i.e.,
more than ninety percent certain, that anthropogenic factors account for these
increases).
21. See Terry Barker et al., Technical Summary, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
MITIGATION. CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT
REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 25, 39, 90 (B.
Metz et al. eds., 2007).
22. See G8 Leaders Declaration, Responsible Leadership for a Sustainable
Future, para. 65 (July 9, 2009),
http://www.g8italia2009.it/static/G8_Allegato/G8_Declaration_08_07_09_final,0.p
df; Press Release, The White House, Declaration of the Leaders: The Major
Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (July 9, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Declaration-of-the-Leaders-theMajor-Economies-Forum-on-Energy-and-Climate/.
23. See Copenhagen Accord, supra note 1, para. 1.
24. David Doniger, The Copenhagen Accord: A Big Step Forward, CLIMATE
PROGRESS, Dec. 28, 2009, http://climateprogress.org/2009/12/28/the-copenhagenaccord-a-big-step-forward/.
25. Copenhagen Accord, supra note 1, para. 12.
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This might all seem like small progress, but the ramifications are
potentially significant. The temperature target of two degrees Celsius
permits extrapolations regarding maximum allowable concentrations
of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, which in turn permit
conclusions about the timing and extent of the emission reductions
required to achieve those concentrations.26 IPCC findings, confirmed
by later analyses, suggest that robust action is urgently required. 27 To
have a reasonable chance of meeting the objective, greenhouse gas
emissions must peak within the next six years, followed by
significant medium- and long-term emission reductions.28 By 2020,
developed country emissions would have to be cut by twenty-five to
forty percent; by 2050, they would have to be reduced by eighty to
ninety-five percent.29 In other words, its central concept now having
been defined, the Article 2 objective not only provides general
direction to states‘ efforts but sets a bar against which the credibility
of emission reduction commitments can be measured.
B. The Role of CBDR
The Climate Convention calls upon parties to protect the climate
system ―on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.‖30 The
repeated references to CBDR in the climate regime, including most
recently in the Copenhagen Accord, confirm that CBDR is the most

26. The negotiating position of the European Union is constructed precisely in
this fashion. See Communication from the Commission to the Council, the
European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the
Committee of the Regions: Limiting Global Climate Change to 2 Degrees Celsius—
the Way Ahead for 2020 and Beyond, at 2, 9, COM (2007) 2 final (Oct. 1, 2007)
[hereinafter EU Commission Communication on Limiting Global Change to 2
Degrees Celsius], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?
uri=COM:2007:0002:FIN:EN:PDF.
27. See Meinshausen et al., supra note 18, at 1160.
28. See KATHERINE RICHARDSON ET AL., UNIV. OF COPENHAGEN, CLIMATE
CHANGE: GLOBAL RISKS, CHALLENGES & DECISIONS COPENHAGEN 2009, 10–12
MARCH, at 18–20 (2009), available at http://climatecongress.ku.dk/pdf/synthesi
sreport/; Barker et al., supra, note 21, at 90.
29. This is the range of required reductions that was established in the IPCC‘s
2007 Report. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE
CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 66–67 (Rajendra K. Pachauri et al. eds., 2007),
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf.
30. UNFCCC, supra note 13, art. 3(1).
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important among the principles that frame the climate regime.31
However, it is one thing to enshrine a principle in a treaty and quite
another for that principle to have an agreed-upon meaning. A closer
look at the UNFCCC, related sources, and relevant practice reveals
that, while some elements of CBDR are generally agreed upon, others
are still subject to debate.
Based on the submissions by states under the auspices of the Bali
Action Plan, it seems fair to say that there is broad consensus that
states have a common responsibility to address climate change,32 that
their resulting individual responsibilities should be differentiated, 33
and that industrialized countries should take the lead in combating
climate change.34 Much less common ground exists with respect to
the criteria for differentiation of individual state responsibilities. For
instance, disagreements remain on whether historical and per capita
emissions are appropriate criteria for differentiation35 and whether
CBDR requires industrialized states to provide financial and technical
assistance to developing countries.36
Meanwhile, it is generally accepted that capacity differentials,
especially between developing and industrialized states, are
relevant.37 More recently, there has also been growing support for
31. See Copenhagen Accord, supra note 1, para. 1.
32. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Ad Hoc
Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the Convention, First
Sess., Bangkok, Thail., Mar. 1–Apr. 8, 2008, Views Regarding the Work
Programme of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action
Under the Convention, U.N. Doc. FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/MISC.1 (Mar. 3, 2008)
[hereinafter UNFCCC Ad Hoc Working Group Views (1st Sess.)], available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2008/awglca1/eng/misc01.pdf. See, e.g., id. at 66
(stating Singapore‘s view that ―[a]ll countries, both developed and developing,
have a part to play to address climate change . . .‖).
33. See Lavanya Rajamani, From Stockholm to Johannesburg: The Anatomy of
Dissonance in the International Environmental Dialogue, 12 REV. EUR.
COMMUNITY & INT‘L ENVTL. L. 23, 31 (2003).
34. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Ad Hoc
Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the Convention, Fifth
Sess., Bonn, F.R.G., Mar. 29–Apr. 8, 2009, Fulfilment of the Bali Action Plan and
Components of the Agreed Outcome: Note by the Chair, para. 30, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/4 (Part II) (Mar. 18, 2009), available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/awglca5/eng/04p02.pdf.
35. See Jutta Brunnée, Climate Change, Global Environmental Justice and
International Environmental Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND JUSTICE IN
CONTEXT 316, 326–27 (Jonas Ebbesson & Phoebe Okowa eds., 2009).
36. See Rajamani, supra note 33, at 31.
37. See, e.g., Tuula Honkonen, The Principle of Common But Differentiated
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differentiation among industrialized and developing countries.38 The
latter trend is of particular interest and is well illustrated by the
shared vision negotiations. They reveal that states‘ understandings of
the CBDR principle are evolving in this respect. To be sure, some
states remained staunchly opposed to differentiation among
developing countries. For example, according to China, ―[t]he
principle of ‗common but differentiated responsibilities‘ between
developed and developing countries is the keystone of the
Convention . . . . Any further sub-categorization of developing
countries runs against the Convention . . . .‖39 But the view that the
CBDR principle, as reflected in the climate regime, does not preclude
and may even require differentiation within groups appeared to be
shared by a growing number of parties, both developed and
developing.40 For example, Australia argued:
There has to be yet further differentiation of responsibilities
and capabilities other than highlighting the vulnerability and
lack of capacity of some Parties to respond to the impacts of
climate change.
There is considerable variation in the circumstances of the
Responsibility in Post-2012 Climate Negotiations, 18 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY &
INT‘L ENVTL. L. 257, 259 (2009) (commenting on the fact that both the UNFCCC
and the Kyoto Protocol are explicitly based on the distinction between Annex I
(industrialized countries and countries with economies in transition) and nonAnnex I (developing) countries).
38. See, e.g., United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Ad
Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the Convention,
Fourth Sess., Poznan, Pol., Dec. 1–10, 2008, Ideas and Proposals on the Elements
Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Submissions from Parties—
Addendum, at 14, U.N. Doc. FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/MISC.5/Add.1 (Nov. 21,
2008) (stating France‘s view, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2008/aw
glca4/eng/misc05a01.pdf (on behalf of the European Community) of enhanced
national and international action on the mitigation of climate change).
39. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Ad Hoc
Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the Convention, Fourth
Sess., Poznan, Pol., Dec. 1–10, 2008, Ideas and Proposals on the Elements
Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Submissions from Parties, at 34,
U.N. Doc. FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/MISC.5 (Oct. 27, 2008), available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2008/awglca4/eng/misc05.pdf (stating China‘s
views on implementation of the Climate Convention through long-term cooperative
action).
40. But see Lavanya Rajamani, Differentiation in the Post-2012 Climate
Regime, 4 POL‘Y Q. 48, 49 (2008) (noting that most developing countries oppose
efforts to differentiate between them).
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191 countries in the UNFCCC. Accordingly, there can be
many different approaches to differentiating and grouping
countries according to such circumstances.41
Similarly, France submitted on behalf of the European Community
that ―a key issue to explore . . . is what the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities means for
national appropriate mitigation action between and within
groupings . . . .‖42 Developing countries, in turn, focused their
remarks primarily on differentiation within their group. For example,
the task of the negotiations for Bangladesh was to ―[d]etermine
global mitigation targets for post Kyoto climate regime based on
common but differentiated responsibility (regarding but not limited to
the time paths, peaking years and allowable limits of emission)
between the developed and developing countries and within
developing countries, between the LDCs and the rest of them.‖ 43
Egypt maintained that ―responsibilities should be seen against the
fact that there are different levels of development within developing
countries. We therefore call for the inclusion of criterion of income
level and growth in the issue of climate change . . . .‖44 Finally, the
Maldives observed that, ―while the differing national circumstances
between developed and developing countries have been
acknowledged in Article 1(b)(v) [of the Bali Action Plan], vast
differences also exist between many of the developing countries,
41. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Ad Hoc
Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the Convention, First
Sess., Bangkok, Thail., Mar. 31–Apr. 4, 2008, Views Regarding the Work
Programme of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action
Under the Convention: Submissions from Parties—Addendum, at 7–8, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/MISC.1/Add.2 (Mar. 20, 2008), available at
http://unfcccbali.org/unfccc/images/document/Action_Under_Convention.pdf
(stating Australia‘s view on a long-term global goal for emission reductions).
42. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Ad Hoc
Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the Convention, Third
Sess., Accra, Ghana, Aug. 21–27, 2008, Ideas and Proposals on the Elements
Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Submissions from Parties, at 5,
U.N. Doc. FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/MISC.2 (Aug. 14, 2008), available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2008/awglca3/eng/misc02.pdf (stating France‘s
view (on behalf of the European Community) on mitigation, including by
technology and finance).
43. UNFCCC Ad Hoc Working Group Views (1st Sess.), supra note 32, at 10
(Bangladesh‘s submission on the Bali Action Plan). LDCs refer to least developed
countries.
44. Id. at 23 (Egypt‘s submission on long-term cooperative action).
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particularly the large ones and the LDC[s].‖45
Notwithstanding lingering debates about its meaning, CBDR has
been a crucial factor in stabilizing and directing the climate regime to
date. The power of the principle is illustrated, for example, by the
inability of the Bush Administration to extricate itself from the UN
regime. Arguably, the United States‘ attitude towards the Kyoto
Protocol antagonized others at least in part because it appeared to
challenge head on the basic ideas that animate CBDR. As we have
seen, the notion that addressing climate change is a common
responsibility is a strongly shared understanding.46 Against this
normative backdrop, the United States‘ refusal to join the Kyoto
Protocol was widely read as unilateralism and thus struck a
particularly negative chord with other nations.47 Similarly, it may
well be sensible to suggest that all major emitters, including
developing countries, must participate for a climate regime to be
effective. But the flat refusal by one of the wealthiest states in the
world—and one of its major carbon emitters—to take on emission
reduction commitments clashed with a generally shared sense that
developed countries should take the lead in combating climate
change.48
Interestingly, under the new Administration, a re-articulation of the
U.S. position is discernible. While the United States still insists on
developing country participation in an emissions regime, its
proposals are now expressed in terms that are compatible with
CBDR. Thus, the argument is no longer a bald statement that the
United States will not take on commitments unless major developing
countries do the same. Instead, the argument is that CBDR actually
45. Id. at 32 (Maldives‘ submission on Bali Action Plan).
46. See Honkonen, supra note 37, at 265.
47. See Anger at US Climate Retreat, BBC, Mar. 28, 2001,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/1248278.stm.
48. Indeed, rarely have states so openly expressed their resentment of U.S.
climate policy as did Papua New Guinea‘s ambassador for climate change when,
reacting to the outgoing Bush Administration‘s initial refusal to support the Bali
Action Plan on long-term cooperative action, the ambassador stated that, ―if for
some reason you‘re not willing to lead, leave it to the rest of us. Please get out of
the way.‖ Andrew C. Revkin, Issuing a Bold Challenge to the U.S. Over Climate,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2008, at F2, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/
22/science/earth/22conv.html (quoting Kevin Conrad).
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demands, or at least accommodates, differentiation among
developing countries,49 suggesting that major developing economies
with large emissions must accept some emissions commitments. In
other words, the United States has stopped arguing against the basic
understandings that underpin the regime and has begun to work with
the CBDR concept.
Major developing countries like China and India have always
sought to draw rhetorical power from the convention principles. They
worked hard during the negotiations of the UNFCCC to enshrine
principles such as equity and CBDR in the convention and have
consistently raised these concepts in the negotiations for a post-2012
regime.50 As noted, in the past, China and India refused to
contemplate any emission reduction commitments whatsoever. The
argument was that pursuant to CBDR only industrialized countries
should take on such commitments and, at any rate, they should take
the lead in cutting emissions. While the latter point resonates with the
shared understandings of CBDR, the former fell increasingly out of
step with the basic thrust of the principle. Once China and India
emerged as major carbon emitters—with China displacing the United
States as the single largest emitter—the CBDR principle began to
work against insistence on complete exemption from emission
reductions.51 Instead, the notion of common responsibility actually
calls for some action by all major emitters. The most widely shared
rationale for CBDR, capacity differentials, suggests that salient
49. See, e.g., UNFCCC Ad Hoc Working Group Ideas and Proposals, Fourth
Sess., supra note 17, para. 22(h) (citing Australia, New Zealand, the Russian
Federation, and the United States for the proposition that ―[n]ew sight on the
differentiation among Parties is required . . . based on recent advances in scientific
knowledge and changing social and economic situation in the world . . .‖).
50. See Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change: A Commentary, 18 YALE J. INT‘L L. 451, 501–05 (1993); e.g.,
UNFCCC Ad Hoc Working Group Views (1st Sess.), supra note 32, at 18 (stating
China‘s view that ―[i]n developing . . . [a shared] vision [for long-term cooperative
action], it is important to take into account the principles of equity and common but
differentiated responsibilities . . . ‖); id. at 31–32 (India‘s submission on long-term
cooperative action).
51. This point has not escaped the attention of the new U.S. Administration. See
Glenn Kessler, Clinton, Indian Minister Clash Over Emissions Reduction Pact,
WASH. POST, July 20, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2009/07/19/AR2009071900705.html (noting that Secretary of State Hillary
Rodham Clinton ―‗completely‘ understood Indian arguments about per capita
emissions . . . but [nevertheless thought] that the per capita argument ‗loses force‘
as developing countries rapidly become the biggest emitters‖).
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differences within the developing and developed country groupings
of states should be taken into account. Indeed, even if ―historical‖
contributions to climate change were generally seen to be a criterion
for differentiation, CBDR does not completely insulate major
developing country emitters from emissions-related commitments.52
Both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol use 1990 as a reference
year for emission reductions.53 The emissions trajectory in major
developed and developing emitters since 1990 militate in favour of
the latter‘s inclusion in a commitment regime, while reducing the
exposure of developed countries with respect to their cumulative
emissions.54 As a result, it has become increasingly difficult for major
developing economies with significant carbon emissions to refuse
reduction commitments outright. This accounts at least in part for the
redoubled efforts of China and India to ensure the continuation of the
Kyoto Protocol while softening their stance on emission reductions.55
III. THE COPENHAGEN ACCORD
A. CBDR
Arguably, to respect the CBDR principle, a post-2012 regime must
see developed countries take the lead on emission reductions through
credible mid-term targets as well as take on commitments that reflect
their greater capacity and share of emissions. Major developing
countries, by contrast, may initially commit to mitigation-related
actions but not take on specific reduction targets. However, given
developing countries‘ rapidly rising share of global emissions, CBDR
is compatible with, and even demands, credible reductions by the
52. See Lavanya Rajamani, The Principle of Common but Differentiated
Responsibility and the Balance of Commitments Under the Climate Regime, 9 REV.
EUR. COMMUNITY & INT‘L ENVTL. L. 120, 130 (2000).
53. See UNFCCC, supra note 13, art. 4(2); Kyoto Protocol, supra note 14, art.
3(1).
54. See, e.g., Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament,
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of
the Regions: Towards a Comprehensive Climate Change Agreement in
Copenhagen, at 5, COM (2009) 39 final (Jan. 28, 2009), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0039:FIN:EN:PDF
(submitting that ―[t]he accepted Kyoto base year, 1990, should be used as the
historical reference point . . . [for further emission reductions by developed
countries] after 2012‖).
55. See infra notes 63–73 and accompanying text.
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main developing country emitters, at least in the longer term. Finally,
differentiation according to capacity and emissions share suggests
that poorer countries or countries with negligible emissions should be
subject to considerably less onerous requirements.
Notwithstanding the difficulties in Copenhagen, the discernible
trends in the climate discussions are broadly consonant with these
parameters. The 2007 Bali Action Plan made only general reference
to the urgency of the situation and the need for ―deep cuts in global
emissions . . . .‖56 At the time, only the Ad Hoc Working Group on
Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol
acknowledged that developed countries had to achieve a collective
emissions cut of twenty-five to forty percent below 1990 levels by
2020.57 Among the developed country parties, only the European
Union was on record with a unilateral commitment to achieve a
twenty percent reduction by 2020, offering a thirty percent cut if
other states followed suit.58 In the lead up to the Copenhagen
meeting, other industrialized countries (and some industrializing
states) announced reduction commitments that they were prepared to
make.59 The most significant movement undoubtedly came from the
United States, which had, since abandoning the Kyoto Protocol in
2001, refused to take on international emission reduction
commitments. In November 2009, President Barack Obama
announced his Administration‘s willingness to cut U.S. emissions by
seventeen percent below 2005 levels by 2020.60 This shift prompted
China to come forward with a pledge to reduce the carbon intensity
56. Bali Action Plan, supra note 15, pmbl.
57. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Ad Hoc
Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties Under the Kyoto
Protocol, Bali, Indon., Dec. 3–15, 2007, Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on
Further Commitments for Annex I Parties Under the Kyoto Protocol on its
Resumed Fourth Session, Held in Bali from 3 to 15 December 2001, para. 16, U.N.
Doc. FCCC/KP/AWG/2007/5 (Feb. 5, 2008), available at http://unfccc.int/resou
rce/docs/2007/awg4/eng/05.pdf.
58. See EU Commission Communication on Limiting Global Change to 2
Degrees Celsius, supra note 26, at 2; Climate control: The European Union Thinks
It Can Be a Model for the World on Climate Change. Can it?, ECONOMIST, Mar.
15, 2007, at 59, available at EBSCOhost Academic Search Premier, AN 24406423.
59. See Elisabeth Rosenthal & Neil MacFarquhar, Industrialized Nations Unveil
Plans to Rein in Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2009, at A10, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/20/science/earth/20climate.html.
60. John M. Broder, Obama to Go to Copenhagen with Emissions Target, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 26, 2009, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/26/us/politics/26climate.html.
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of its economy by forty to forty-five percent from 2005 levels by
2020.61 India followed suit with an intensity-based proposal of its
own.62
The submissions by parties pursuant to the Bali Action Plan
foreshadowed some of the dynamics that played out during the
Copenhagen meetings. Since Copenhagen was to yield commitments
on concrete emission reductions or, for developing countries, other
―actions‖ on climate change,63 it is perhaps not surprising that matters
came to a head. It became apparent that many developing countries
saw a continuation of the Kyoto Protocol as essential to the further
development of the climate regime. For some developing states,
notably small island states, this position reflected their desire to
maintain the only instrument that contained legally binding emission
reduction commitments by industrialized countries.64 For others, led
by China and India, Kyoto enshrined the only acceptable model of
differentiation—the distinction between industrialized states that had
binding emission reduction commitments and developing countries
that did not.65 By contrast, most industrialized countries wished to see
61. Edward Wong & Keith Bradsher, China Joins U.S. in Pledge of Hard
Targets on Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2009, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/27/science/earth/27climate.html.
62. See Rama Lakshmi, Moves by U.S., China Induce India to Do Its Bit on
Climate, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/12/01/AR2009120102591.html.
63. For industrialized states, the Bali Action Plan contemplates ―[n]ationally
appropriate mitigation commitments or actions, including quantified emission
limitation and reduction objectives, . . .‖ whereas for developing countries it
envisages only ―[n]ationally appropriate mitigation actions . . . .‖ See Bali Action
Plan, supra note 15, para. 1(b)(i)–(ii).
64. See, e.g., United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Ad
Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the Convention,
Eighth Sess., Copenhagen, Den., Dec. 7–15, 2009, Ideas and Proposals on the
Elements Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Submissions from
Parties, at 15, U.N. Doc. FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/MISC.8 (Dec. 18, 2009),
available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/awglca8/eng/misc08.pdf (proposal
by Alliance of Small Island States for the survival of the Kyoto Protocol);
LAVANYA RAJAMANI, CTR. FOR POL‘Y RESEARCH, THE COPENHAGEN AGREED
OUTCOME: FORM, SHAPE & INFLUENCE 1–2 (2009), available at
http://www.cprindia.org/policyupload/1259569856-CPR%20Polic%20Brief2.pdf.
65. See, e.g., “Kyoto Principles” Crucial in Climate Talks: China, REUTERS,
Nov. 14, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5AD0NV20091114; Big
Developing Countries Form Climate Change Front, REUTERS, Nov. 29, 2009,
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSPEK20047.
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the Kyoto Protocol replaced by a single, comprehensive instrument
with appropriately differentiated commitments for all countries,
including emission-related commitments for the major developing
economies.66
In other words, the fate of the Kyoto Protocol became one of the
battle grounds for the underlying questions of principle. After all, the
stark distinction drawn in the UNFCCC between Annex I parties
(industrialized states and countries with economies in transition) and
non-Annex I parties (developing countries) to the Climate
Convention and the Kyoto Protocol—which applied this distinction
to emission reduction commitments—was seen by some developing
countries as a bulwark against efforts to single out some developing
countries on account of their growing greenhouse gas emissions. The
Bali Action Plan had begun to weaken the bulwark, replacing the
distinction between Annex I and non-Annex I states with a more
open-ended distinction between developed and developing
countries.67 Still, for many developing countries, the Bali Action Plan
maintained at least a ―firewall‖ against further differentiation and,
hence, against emission reduction commitments for developing
countries.68
At the time of this writing, the ultimate fate of the Kyoto Protocol
is uncertain. A Danish proposal that would have set the post-2012
climate regime on a single instrument track was leaked to the press
shortly after the beginning of the Copenhagen talks.69 Developing
countries, led by a small but determined group of states—which were
widely seen to operate with at least the backing of China and India—
resisted the formal introduction of the text into the negotiating

66. See LAVANYA RAJAMANI, CTR. FOR POL‘Y RESEARCH, THE ―CLOUD‖ OVER
THE CLIMATE NEGOTIATIONS: FROM BANGKOK TO COPENHAGEN AND BEYOND 1–3

(2009),
available
at
http://www.cprindia.org/policyupload/1256103508CPR%20Polic%20Brief.pdf.
67. See Bali Action Plan, supra note 15, para. 1(b)(i)–(ii); Chris Spence et al.,
Great Expectations: Understanding Bali and the Climate Change Negotiation
Process, 17 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT‘L ENVTL. L. 142, 150 (2008)
(commenting on the subtle but significant shift in the language of the Bali Action
Plan).
68. See RAJAMANI, supra note 66, at 2.
69. See John Vidal, Copenhagen Climate Summit in Disarray After „Danish
Text‟ Leak, GUARDIAN, Dec. 8, 2009,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/08/copenhagen-climate-summitdisarray-danish-text (including link to the leaked ―Danish text‖).
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process.70 The fact that the proposal had apparently been developed in
consultation with only the United States and the United Kingdom did
not help matters, nor did the fact that many developing countries saw
its content as skewed towards industrialized country preferences. 71
Whereas the Danish proposal appeared designed to lead to a
replacement of the Kyoto Protocol, the last-minute Copenhagen
Accord leaves the issue unmentioned.72
Nonetheless, the Copenhagen Accord suggests some softening in
China and India‘s resistance to emission-related measures. Indeed,
the document does contain some genuine breakthroughs. In addition
to ―quantified economy-wide emissions targets for 2020‖ by Annex I
parties, it envisages ―mitigation actions‖ by non-Annex I parties—a
―first‖ in the climate regime.73 Equally significant, however, is the
fact that the Copenhagen Accord commits industrialized countries to
providing ―new and additional resources . . . approaching USD 30
billion for the period 2010–2012 . . . [and to mobilizing] USD 100
billion a year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries.‖74
Broadly speaking, the Copenhagen Accord is consonant with the
CBDR principle. At first glance, the fact that the Copenhagen Accord
was negotiated by only a small number of states and only
subsequently acknowledged by all parties to the climate regime may
appear to undercut the notion of ―common responsibility.‖ Indeed, a
―coalition of the willing‖ approach would seem to run counter to that
notion. Many developing countries insisted on maintaining the
consensus approach to decision making that had become the default
practice in the climate regime and complained bitterly about the lack
of access to and transparency of the negotiations that produced the
70. See Dan Bodansky, The Illegitimacy of “Legitimacy”, OPINIO JURIS, Dec.
17, 2009, http://opiniojuris.org/2009/12/17/the-illegitimacy-of-%e2%80%9cle
gitimacy.
71. See Vidal, supra note 69.
72. Apparently, an earlier draft of the document was unacceptable to developing
countries because of a preambular statement affirming parties‘ ―firm resolve to
adopt one or more legal instruments,‖ thereby acknowledging the possible demise
of the Kyoto Protocol. See Jonathan Watts, What Was Agreed at Copenhagen—and
What Was Left Out, GUARDIAN, Dec. 19, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/envir
onment/2009/dec/18/how-copenhagen-text-was-changed.
73. Copenhagen Accord, supra note 1, paras. 4–5.
74. Id. para. 8.
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Copenhagen Accord.75 However, according to many observers, it was
in fact a relatively small number of developing countries that blocked
consensus decision making at a number of crucial junctures, while
many other developing countries desperately wanted progress to be
made.76 What is more, while the Copenhagen Accord may have
ruffled feathers in part because it was announced by the U.S.
President before it had been released to, let alone sanctioned by, the
parties to the Climate Convention,77 it did appear to have had the
support of the leaders of key industrialized and developing states
from around the world.78
Even if, procedurally speaking, the Copenhagen Accord was
squeezed out from between a rock and hard place, its substance is
more in line with the idea of common responsibility. Developing
countries did ultimately yield to a key demand of most industrialized
states by agreeing to commit themselves internationally to the same
instrument, albeit a nonbinding one.79 Furthermore, notwithstanding
the negotiation of the Copenhagen Accord by a small group of states,
its aspiration is to operate in the context of the UNFCCC. It declares
itself to be guided by the principles of the Climate Convention,
including CBDR.80 It also envisages drawing on the Climate
Convention to implement a number of its key provisions. For
example, the Conference of the Parties is to adopt guidelines for the
measuring, reporting, and verification of Annex I emission reductions
and financing, as well as for national communications by non-Annex
I countries regarding their actions.81 Similarly, in the context of the
funding commitments by developed countries, the Copenhagen
Accord envisages a Copenhagen Green Climate Fund to be
75. See JOHN DREXHAGE & DEBORAH MURPHY, INT‘L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEV., COPENHAGEN: A MEMORABLE TIME FOR ALL THE WRONG REASONS?, INT‘L
INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. 2 (2009), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2009/cop_memo
rable_time_wrong_reasons.pdf.
76. See id.; Doniger, supra note 24; Bodansky, supra note 70; Dan Bodansky,
Sleepless
in
Copenhagen,
OPINIO
JURIS,
Dec.
19,
2009,
http://opiniojuris.org/2009/12/19/sleepless-in-copenhagen-2/ [hereinafter
Bodansky, Sleepless in Copenhagen].
77. See DREXHAGE & MURPHY, supra note 75.
78. See Bodansky, Sleepless in Copenhagen, supra note 76; Doniger, supra note
24 (citing support by leaders of twenty-eight developed and developing countries).
79. See Doniger, supra note 24 (observing that such a development would have
been unthinkable only a year earlier and that China and India would not have
agreed to the accord had it been legally binding).
80. See Copenhagen Accord, supra note 1, pmbl., para. 1.
81. Id. paras. 4–5.
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―established as an operating entity of the financial mechanism of the
[Climate] Convention . . . .‖82
The ultimate relationship between the Copenhagen Accord and the
climate regime is difficult to predict, and the Accord does not provide
guidance on the matter. The Accord merely endorses two parallel
decisions under the Climate Convention and the Kyoto Protocol,
respectively, to extend by one year the formal negotiations towards
an agreed-upon outcome on post-2012 climate action.83 Many parties
are still looking to bring the Accord more resolutely into the climate
regime than was accomplished when parties decided only to take note
of it.84 Indeed, earlier drafts of the Accord had envisaged that it would
be converted into a legally binding instrument within a year‘s time.
However, the relevant text was dropped (apparently) in the face of
resistance by some states, including China, India, and Saudi Arabia.85
As for the idea of differentiated responsibilities, the Accord clearly
distinguishes between industrialized and developing countries. As we
have seen, it reverts to the rigid categorization of states as Annex I
and non-Annex I and distinguishes the commitments of these two
groups of parties. Furthermore, Annex I parties opt into the
Copenhagen Accord by registering their target pledges in one
appendix to the Accord, while developing countries register their
emissions intensity pledges in another.86 Finally, the Accord requires
82. Id. paras. 8, 10.
83. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Ad Hoc
Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the Convention, Draft
Decision -/CP.15: Outcome of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term
Cooperative Action Under the Convention, para. 1, available at
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_15/application/pdf/cop15_lca_auv.pdf; United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Ad Hoc Working Group on
Further Commitments for Annex I Parties Under the Kyoto Protocol, Draft
Decision -/CMP.5: Outcome of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further
Commitments for Annex I Parties Under the Kyoto Protocol, para. 2, available at
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_15/application/pdf/cmp5_awg_auv.pdf.
84. See, e.g., UK‟s Brown Says Climate Change Agreement Possible, TIMES OF
INDIA, Jan. 4, 2010,
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/environment/developmental-issues/UKsBrown-says-climate-change-agreement-possible/articleshow/5409324.cms.
85. See Bryson, supra note 3; PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE,
SUMMARY OF COP 15 AND CMP 5 (2009), http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/
copenhagen-cop15-summary.pdf.
86. Copenhagen Accord, supra note 1, paras. 4–5.
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developed countries to provide significant resources to developing
countries. While the Accord therefore reflects the insistence of key
developing countries on the distinction between industrialized and
developing countries, it also suggests that the idea of differentiation
among developing countries is taking hold. Within the group of nonAnnex I parties, the Accord singles out least developed countries and
developing nations that are especially vulnerable to climate change.
Notably, whereas non-Annex I states ―will implement mitigation
actions, . . . least developed and small island developing States may
undertake actions voluntarily and on the basis of support.‖87 The
Accord also identifies the most vulnerable developing countries,
―especially least developed countries, small island developing States
and Africa‖ as priority recipients of adaptation funding.88
B. The Climate Convention Objective
The Copenhagen Accord fares less well when measured against the
objective of the climate regime. To be sure, it declares itself to be in
pursuit of the objective and endorses the two-degree Celsius
temperature goal.89 However, collectively, the reduction pledges
made by Annex I countries in the lead up to the Copenhagen
meetings have been calculated to promise a reduction only thirteen to
nineteen percent below 1990 emission levels.90 Although significant,
these pledges remain considerably below the reduction range said to
be required to meet the Climate Convention objective. As a result,
and assuming that parties‘ pledges will track their previous
announcements, the Copenhagen Accord will not live up to the
demands of the UNFCCC‘s objective. In fact, when the most
ambitious emissions pledges for 2020 by developed countries are
combined with those made by China and India, recent estimates
suggest that these efforts would put the world on track for, at a
minimum, a 3.2-degree Celsius temperature increase by 2100.91

87. Id. para. 5.
88. Id. para. 3.
89. Id. pmbl., paras. 1–2.
90. Kelly Levin & Rob Bradley, Comparability of Annex I Emission Reduction
Pledges 2 (World Res. Inst., Working Paper, 2009), available at
http://pdf.wri.org/working_papers/comparability_of_annex1_emission_reduction_p
ledges_2009-12-04.pdf.
91. See NIKLAS HÖHNE ET AL., CLIMATE ACTION TRACKER, COPENHAGEN
CLIMATE DEAL—HOW TO CLOSE THE GAP? 6 (2009), http://www.climateactiontr
acker.org/briefing_paper.pdf.
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As for a long-term target, the G8 Declaration of 2009 indicates that
major developed countries were prepared to accept an eighty percent
emissions cut by 2050, so long as all countries commit to achieving a
fifty percent reduction in global emissions.92 A similar approach was
to find expression in the MEF Declaration but was ultimately rejected
by the developing country members of the forum, led by China and
India.93 Developing countries were not satisfied with the draft text on
mid-term targets for developed countries, which merely declared that
the latter would ―undertake robust aggregate and individual mid-term
reductions in the 2020 timeframe.‖94 Instead, developing countries
insisted that industrialized states make commitments in the twentyfive to forty percent range indicated by the IPCC.95 The issue
remained unresolved in Copenhagen, given the far more modest
range of industrialized country commitments. Indeed, an earlier draft
of the Copenhagen Accord contained a global goal to reduce
emissions by fifty percent by 2050, with an industrialized country
pledge of eighty percent.96 The relevant passages were apparently
dropped because of developing country concerns about an implicit
commitment to long-term emission cuts on their part.97
IV. CONCLUSION
It is easy to dismiss the Bali Action Plan‘s notion of a ―shared
92. See G8 Leaders Declaration, supra note 22.
93. See Alister Doyle, Major Economies Consider Halving World CO2,
REUTERS, June 25, 2009,
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE55O4EJ20090625 (reporting a draft text
according to which the MEF supported ―‗[a]n aspirational goal of reducing global
emissions by 50 percent by 2050, with developed countries reducing emissions by
at least 80 percent by 2050‘‖ and declared that developed states would
―‗[u]ndertake robust aggregate and individual mid-term reductions in the 2020
timeframe‘‖).
94. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
95. See Patrick Wintour, Developing Countries Urge G8 to Impose 40%
Emissions Cut by 2020, GUARDIAN, July 10, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2009/jul/10/developing-countries-emissions-cut-g8.
96. See David Biello, Draft Text of New “Copenhagen Accord”, SCI. AM., Dec.
18, 2009, http://www.scientificamerican.com/blog/post.cfm?id=draft-text-of-newcopenhagen-accord-2009-12-18.
97. See Chris Holly, Disappointed Climate Delegates „Take Note‟ of Vague
Greenhouse Accord, ENERGY DAILY, Dec. 19, 2009, http://www.theenergydaily.
com/events/climateconf2009-12-19.html; DREXHAGE & MURPHY, supra note 75, at
3.
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vision‖ for long-term climate action as empty rhetoric. I argue that
the success of the global climate regime is not guaranteed by a mere
deal among key participants. To be sure, the difficulties of the
Copenhagen meeting resulted in good part from the reluctance of
parties to make ambitious emission-related commitments. But the
difficulties also stemmed from continuing disagreements about
important aspects of the principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities. It stands to reason that a viable post-2012 agreement
must be consonant with that principle as well as with the regime‘s
objective. Only then will the foundation exist for specific
commitments that are legitimate and that can generate a sense of
commitment among parties. Measured against this yardstick, the
Copenhagen Accord represents important progress in some respects
but also falls considerably short in others.
The Copenhagen Accord does reflect the core elements of the
CBDR principle. Indeed, in relation to CBDR, the Accord represents
a flawed but nonetheless important step towards a shared
understanding of the meaning of the principle, especially as it relates
to differentiation among developing countries. Given the deficiencies
in the process that led to the Accord, it is crucial that parties now
consider the vision of CBDR that it contains. If a shared
understanding is to emerge, that vision must be genuinely embraced
by industrialized and developing states rather than simply ―noted.‖
By contrast, in relation to the regime objective, there appears to
exist a shared understanding that temperature increases must be held
to two degrees Celsius or potentially less.98 Given the emissionrelated pledges made by key states prior to the Copenhagen meeting,
all indications are that the Copenhagen Accord will not live up to the
requirements of the objective. The fact that over 100 heads of state
and government attended the Copenhagen Summit attests to the
importance that governments and people around the world now attach
to climate change. It is perhaps for this reason that U.S. President
Obama and others have described the Copenhagen Accord as a ―first
step‖99 and an ―essential beginning.‖100
98. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text.
99. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President During Press
Availability in Copenhagen, supra note 2.
100. See, e.g., UN Says Copenhagen Deal „a Start‟, BBC, Dec. 19, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/8422133.stm.
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What, then, should we make of the Copenhagen Accord? As I hope
to have shown, the contours of any future agreement on climate
change are intertwined with the overall objective and core principle
of the climate regime. Both have shaped the negotiations and the
positions that parties have taken. In turn, parties have progressively
fleshed out the meaning of the regime objective, and their
interventions under the auspices of the Bali Action Plan reveal
concerted efforts to maintain or shift the meaning of the CBDR
principle. The Copenhagen Accord may be best understood not as a
makeshift solution to climate change but as a barometer for the
evolving normative understandings in the climate regime.

